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United States Policy on Southern Africa:
A Myopic Vacuum?
by Charles K. Ebinger*
Mr. Ebinger's article explores the recent developments in United States foreign
policy on southern Africa. He measures the policies against the economic, military,
and ideological pressures on the political forces competing for control of the area. His
analysis indicates that the demands of the developed countries on the natural resources
of the area and United States foreign policy which ignores the factors essential to
African national and interstate stability have contributed to the tenseness of the situa-
tion in southern Africa today.
INTRODUCTION
T HE ORGANIZATION of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OAPEC) embargo of 1973-74 which followed the 1973 Middle
Eastern War stimulated awareness of and concern over the present
pattern of international economic relationships. Although much atten-
tion has been focused on the security implications of Western
dependency on Middle Eastern oil, increasingly, a growing interest in
the security aspects of other strategic minerals and their international
logistics systems has shifted interest away from the Arabian Gulf to
other regions, the most important of which is southern Africa. This
shift, however, has not been accompanied by the development of
coherent United States foreign policies on southern Africa.
The southern African littoral States served as a pivotal link in
Western communication systems during World War II. Nevertheless,
after the end of the war the area received little attention from Western
strategic planners until the closure of the Suez Canal during the 1967
Middle Eastern War focused attention on the vulnerability of oil
transportation routes around the Cape of Good Hope. But despite the
concern generated in some circles, most geopolitical theorists remained
enmeshed either in East-West great power relations or in the events in
Southeast Asia. The continuation of the status quo white regimes in
the southern tier of the continent seemed so secure through the 1970's
that then National Security Adviser Kissinger began to plan in
February 1969 a subtle shift in the United States' policies toward
*A Ph.D. candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts
University, and an international energy consultant with the firm of Melvin A. Conant
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southern Africa based on the assumption of such continuation. Kis-
singer prepared for President Nixon a "realistic" set of secret policy op-
tions designed to foster American interests, and presented them in a
National Security Council briefing.'
Kissinger was aware that friendly African States, such as Zambia
and Tanzania, might castigate the United States for subordinating its
professed belief in the right of self-determination to the protection of
its material interests. He assumed that white rule in even the weakest
link of the system-the Portuguese colonies-would continue for the
foreseeable future. This was a gross miscalculation which starkly ex-
hibits the dangerous tendency of strategic analysts to view the southern
African arena only from an anti-Soviet geopolitical vantage point. This
view is deficient because it neglects serious analysis of the constellation
of local political forces (guerrilla groups, the Front-line States, African
nationalist groups) that will, in the final analysis, be the critical
elements determining the political evolution of the area.
2
Indeed, by the early 1970's, there were many indications that Por-
tugal's days as a Eurafrican power were numbered. The Caetano
regime was beset by demoralization and defection within its African
forces as it suffered from rising economic dislocation and inflation at
home. During this time more than 1.5 million job seekers and draft
evaders emigrated to western Europe and the Portuguese government
was besieged by escalating levels of anti-regime terrorism and
sabotage.3
However, despite these indications of internal weakness, Kissinger,
and other high level State Department officials chose to overlook the
vulnerability of the Caetano regime. As a result, although NSSM 39
stated that the United States had no strategic interests in Angola that
were vital to United States national security, Kissinger believed that
America would have to direct its policies in favor of the white-ruled
southern African regimes so as to maintain access to military facilities
in the Azores.
The importance of the Azores base in the American resupply airlift
to Israel during the October 1973 War reinforced Kissinger's belief in
'INational Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa, Study in
Response to National Security Study Memorandum 39: Southern Africa, AF/NSC-
1G69, Aug. 15, 1969 (usually referred to as NSSM 39).
'For an elaboration of these issues see Ebinger, External Intervention in Internal
War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Angolan Civil War, 20 ORBis 669 (1976).
Marcum, Lessons of Angola, 54 FoR. AFF. 407, 408 (1976).
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the need to maintain good relations with the Caetano regime. By the
spring of 1974, Kissinger, in the wake of the OAPEC embargo and the
Soviet naval buildup in the Indian Ocean, was forced to reassess the
geopolitical significance of Portuguese Africa to United States security.
Although the Lisbon coup of April 1974 had made the United
States strategy as outlined in NSSM 39 irrelevant, Kissinger, concerned
about the significance of the Soviet naval build-up, made another ma-
jor diplomatic mistake when he decided that the United States'
strategic interests would best be served by supporting General Antonio
de Spinola's plan for a Lusitanian commonwealth. He enlisted the help
of America's old ally, President Joseph Mobutu of Zaire, to ensure that
the Zairois-backed National Front for the Liberation of Angola
(FNLA) would play a major role in the ensuing political struggle in
Angola.
Kissinger, ignoring the advice of his high-level officials in the
Department of State's Bureau of African Affairs, believed that
Mobutu's influence in African nationalist circles would guarantee an
FNLA political triumph over the Marxist-oriented Popular Liberation
Movement of Angola (MPLA) and the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA). The fallacy of the policy's fun-
damental tenets haye been elucidated elsewhere and need not detain
us here.' What is important for analytical purposes is the fact that
Kissinger's parochial understanding of the local dynamics of the
Angolan civil conflict placed the United States in an untenable posi-
tion following the breakdown of the Alvor Agreement in January 1975
and led to the victory of the Soviet-supported MPLA forces by early
1976.5
Although these Angolan events focused world attention on
southern Africa for the first time in many years, twelve months after
the triumph of the Cuban-Soviet supported MPLA forces, the political
milieu in the southern African arenas remains more volatile and com-
plicated than ever before. Even though the new Carter Administration
has pledged itself, unlike its predecessor, to work for a peaceful transi-
tion to majority rule in those regimes still remaining under white
domination, the Administration has to date exhibited an appalling ig-
norance of the conflict dynamics of the area and has embarked on
'See Ebinger, supra note 2.
SLegum, The Soviet Union, China, and the West in Southern Africa, 54 FOR.
AFF. 745 (1976).
1978]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
policies that are at best ill-conceived, and are undeniably contradic-
tory.
In the ensuing analysis, it will be demonstrated that the continued
inadequacy of United States foreign policy in the southern African
arena arises from (1) a parochial understanding of the conflict
dynamics of the region which, while centered on the quest for majority
rule in Namibia, South Africa, and Rhodesia, extends into other areas
of interstate conflict; (2) a preoccupation on the part of State and
Defense Department Officials, supported by private strategic analysts,
with viewing the region's dynamics in polarized U.S.-Soviet damage
limitation terms rather than in terms of the complex constellation of
political forces competing in the area; and (3) the adherence to the
basic Kissinger strategy, outlined during the Secretary's visit to
southern Africa in April 1976, despite the fact that recent events have
made the strategy largely irrelevant.
BACKGROUND
Most analysts assumed that with the collapse of Portuguese rule in
Angola and Mozambique following the April 1974 Lisbon coup, the
black-ruled Front-line States, in concert with the nationalist
movements, would push forward with the liberation of Zimbabwe,
Namibia and the Republic of South Africa itself. Such assessments,
however, were a gross oversimplification of a highly complex political
situation.
Indeed, in the wake of the Portuguese coup, the power vacuum
that emerged in Mozambique was so intense that the new Frelimo
government, desperate to consolidate its own economic and political
position, moved to defuse the volatile political situation reigning in
southern Africa. Meanwhile in Angola, the Portuguese coup unleashed
a fratricidal conflict among rival claimants for power that effectively
excluded it form the unfolding dialogue between white southern Africa
and the black-ruled States to the north. Likewise in Zambia, President
Kaunda, also confronting an extremely volatile political and economic
crisis, believed that a peaceful diplomatic solution to the Zimbabwe
and Namibian political disputes would be more beneficial to Zambia's
national interest than an all-out race war.
Thus, the relaxation of tension and the ensuing negotiations that
followed were based on the degree of coincidence of interests among
South Africa, Mozambique and Zambia. These interests concerned the
need for a negotiated Zimbabwe settlement and for the avoidance of a
political disintegration in Mozambique. To reflect this mutuality of in-
[Vol. 10:67
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terests, South African Prime Minister Vorster announced on October 23,
1974, that southern Africa had entered a crossroads where it had to
make a choice between peace and the escalation of conflict. 6 Zambia's
response came a few days later when President Kaunda referred to Mr.
Vorster's speech as "the voice of reason" for which Africa had been
waiting long to hear.7
The dynamics of Vorster's detente strategy have been well
delineated elsewhere and need not detain us here. 8 What is significant
for analytical purposes is the fact that the resumption of the dialogue
process among South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania and
Botswana arose because the black countries saw some advantage in
cooperating with South Africa for the achievement of a specific limited
objective-the decolonization of Rhodesia.
To accomplish their goal of bringing a peaceful solution to the
Zimbabwe situation, Nyerere, Kaunda, Khama, Vorster and Machel
moved to institute a settlement between the Smith regime and the
African Nationalist Congress (ANC) leadership. As part of the agree-
ment, the Rhodesian regime was to release detained Zimbabwe na-
tionalists; the Kaunda regime was to close all the Zimbabwe guerrilla
camps on Zambian territory; South Africa -was to withdraw its ground
forces from Rhodesia; and Botswana and Tanzania agreed to pressure
the divided Zimbabwe leadership to close its ranks and to come to the
negotitating table. The outcome of this effort, culminating in meetings
among the various parties at Victoria Falls in August 1975, was renewed
wrangling among the Zimbabwe nationalists. This, combined with
Smith's intransigence and the escalation of the conflict in Angola,
doomed the negotiations to failure.
UNITED STATES POLICY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AFTER APRIL 1974
The Portuguese coup of April 25, 1974, totally eclipsed the
southern African strategy outlined by Kissinger in NSSM 39.
Nonetheless, because of his concern about the strategic significance of
the Soviet naval build-up in the Indian Ocean Basin, Kissinger believed
'Statement by the South African Prime Minister in the Senate, Cape Town, Oct.
23, 1974. For a complete text of this speech see SOUTHERN AFRICAN RECORD, March
1975, at 1 (published by the South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannes-
burg).
'Address by President Kaunda at the University of Zambia, Oct. 26, 1974. See
SoUTHERN AFRICAN RECORD, June 1975, at 17.
8C. LEGUM, SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE SECRET DIPLOMACY OF DETENTE, SOUTH
AFRICA AT THE CROSSROADS (1975).
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that continued United States access to harbor facilities in Angola and
Mozambique was vital and could best be assured by supporting
General Spinola's plan for a Lusitanian commonwealth. At the same
time, Kissinger acted behind the scenes to enlist the help of the United
States' old ally President Mobutu, of Zaire, to ensure that the pro-
western, Zairois-backed FNLA would play a major role in the political
evolution of Angola.
With regard to Zimbabwe, United States policy, while publicly
praising the dialogue policy of the South Africans and the Front-line
States, continued as what is best characterized as the "Tar Baby Op-
tion" of benign neglect. 9 As to Namibia, the United States, while con-
tinuing to voice support for majority rule, consistently refused to
pressure Pretoria on the issue because of Secretary Kissinger's belief in
the strategic importance of South Africa both as a pivotal link in the
western defense capability along the Persian Gulf-Cape sea corridor
and as a major supplier of strategic minerals to western Europe, the
United States and Japan.
Throughout the summer and fall of 1974, the fallacy of the fun-
damental tenets of Kissinger's southern African policy became ap-
parent. The growth of radicalism in the Portuguese Armed Forces
Movement led Portuguese policymakers to direct their support toward
the leftist-oriented MPLA movement in Angola. By September, Ad-
miral Coutinhos' pro-MPLA policies in Luanda forced General Spinola
to assume personal control over all Angolan negotiations. Spinola at-
tempted to negotiate an accord with Mobutu designed to eliminate the
MPLA from the Angolan political scene by supporting the FNLA and
the dissident MPLA factions. Spinola, however, was ousted from power
on September 28th before the policy could be implemented. The fall
of the Spinola government, and the increasingly pro-MPLA position of
the Portuguese armed forces, left the United States with no viable
Angolan policy. The United States had no alternative but to hinge its
policy on the success of a negotiated compromise among the rival par-
ties developing out of the Alvor Agreement of January, 1975.
Kissinger's Angolan policy was in shambles when the last vestige of
hope for a negotiated settlement was lost with the failure of the
Nankuru Summit in June, 1975. Once the agreement broke down, Kis-
inger saw no alternative but covertly to support the FNLA and later




the FNLA-UNITA coalition. In this regard, it should be noted that
the Africa Bureau of the State Department vigorously lobbied with
Kissinger to shift American policy in favor of the MPLA. The failure
of the Kissinger policy lies in the fact that once Soviet and Cuban
forces intervened on the side of the MPLA following the failure of the
Nankuru Summit, Kissinger's parochial view of the Angolan conflict,
focusing only on U.S.-Soviet great power rivalry, precluded the United
States from seeing the more important regional and international con-
text of the Angolan struggle.
It should be noted that the congressional actions of December,,
1975 and January, 1976, which placed a ceiling on the level of U.S.
funding for the FNLA-UNITA coalition, severely restricted Kissinger's
options. Nonetheless, his failure adequately to assess the regional and
global dynamics of the conflict led to a series of policy errors that con-
tinue to plague the implementation of an effective southern African
policy to this day.
Most prominent among Kissinger's errors were the failure to
evaluate (1) the importance of the anti-Chinese component of the
Soviet Angolan policy, (2) the implications of the South African in-
tervention on behalf of the FNLA-UNITA coalion with regard to
viability of dialogue in southern Africa, (3) the ineffectiveness of the
FNLA-UNITA coalition arising from the inveterate ethnic hatred of
the Bakongo and the Ovimbundu, (4) the significant divisions within
the MPLA leadership, (5) the fact that Brazzaville's alignment with the
Soviet Union vis-d-vis the Angolan conflict was primarily designed to
counter Zairois machinations in Cabinda and Angola, and (6) the
devastating effects that the triumph of a radical regime in Angola
could have on the economies of Zambia and Zaire. This misapprehen-
sion was a classic case of myopic worst-case analysis.
In early 1976, United States policy in southern Africa was still in a
shambles. The South African intervention into Angola was an un-
mitigated disaster domestically, regionally, and internationally. 0 In
one stroke, Pretoria destroyed previously orchestrated diplomatic rela-
tions designed to defuse the volatile political situation reigning in
southern Africa. Pretoria's intervention discredited the moderate
detente policies of Zambia and Botswana, and further, fueled the
skepticisim of Mozambique and Tanzania toward the motivations
behind Pretoria's detente policy. In addition, the regime of President
10Spence, Detente in Southern Africa: An Interim Judgment, 53 INT'L AFF. 1
(1977).
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Mobutu, although never known for its championship of the cause of
African liberation, was thrown into disrepute because of its support for
the South African-tainted FNLA-UNITA coalition.
In February, the final stage of the Smith-Nkomo talks collapsed
without a settlement. This was another setback for the moderate
policies of Zambia and Botswana and left those countries little choice
but to join Mozambique and Tanzania in formally scrapping the
negotiations on Rhodesia, and to endorse the guerrilla leadership of
the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA). By March, the political situation
in southern Africa was further intensified by Mozambique's decision to
close the border with Rhodesia and to give full support to the ZIPA
revolutionary high command in its struggle against the Smith regime.
This move toward a more militant posture by the Machel regime
posed grave problems for United States foreign policy on southern
Africa. The closing of the Rhodesia-Mozambique border, and the
escalating Rhodesian conflict placed both the moderates, Kaunda of
Zambia and Khama of Botswana, in a difficult position. Due to their
extremely tenuous economic and political stability, it became increas-
ingly difficult for them to exert a moderating influence on the Front-
line States.
ZAMBIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POST-ANGOLAN PERIOD
The triumph of the Neto regime in Angola posed grave problems
for the Kaunda regime. By gaining control over the Benguela railway,
the Neto regime obtained an economic strangle hold over the Zambian
economy and thus over Zambian foreign policy. One of the chief
reasons that Kaunda had supported the UNITA forces during the
Angolan civil war was that the Benguela railway ran through territory
controlled by UNITA, and Kaunda feared that in the event of a
tripartite partition of Angola, Zambia would be dependent on UNITA
support. This fear of dependence was heightened following the closure
of the Rhodesian-Zambian border in January, 1973, when Zambia was
forced to divert a substantial portion of its foreign trade to the
Angolan port of Lobito via the Benguela railway.
The importance of the Benguela railway to Zambia should not be
underestimated. In 1975, prior to its closing during the Angolan civil
war, the railway carried nearly forty percent of Zaire's and Zambia's
foreign trade, incuding more than one-third of each country's copper
exports. The magnitude of Neto's leverage over Kaunda became ap-
parent when, by 1975, the export of copper accounted for ninety-five
[Vol. 10:67
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percent of export earnings of Zambia and sixty-five percent of those of
Zaire.
The triumph of the MPLA forces in Angola posed acute problems
for the Kaunda regime. Although Zambia could divert some of her ex-
ports to the jammed ports in Tanzania and Mozambique, via Malawi,
both countries were staunch MPLA supporters. In addition, 1975 was
a terrible year for the world copper market. Although copper prices
had picked up somewhat early in the year (ranging between £510 and
£725 per ton), Zambia's high cost of production (£600 per ton), com-
bined with the high rate of foreign indebtedness, meant that the Zam-
bian government, given even the best circumstances, could scarcely an-
ticipate any dividends, royalties, or tax payments from the copper
companies.
To illustrate the seriousness of the problem that Kaunda faced, it
is necessary to note that while 1974 was a good year for copper prices,
Zambia's payments surplus was only eighteen million Kwacha; while its
deficits in 1975 and 1976 were 180 million Kwacha and 225 million
Kwacha respectively. These deficits occurred despite sizable restrictions
on imports, with licenses only being issued for agricultural, transport
and construction equipment, and food. The situation was so bleak that
even if copper prices had risen to £800 per ton, the problem would
have remained.
Throughout 1975 and on into 1976, Zambia's deepening economic
and political crisis led to an increasing dependency on international
financial aid. Although Zambia was able to obtain three separate loans
of nineteen million dollars each from the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) compensatory finance fund, Special Drawing Rights (SDR's) and
special emergency standby facilities, Zambia still owed the World Bank
seventy-three million pounds on eighteen, unpaid loans borrowed bet-
ween 1956 and 1975.
The Zambian request for United States aid in 1975 generated an
acute debate in the United States foreign policy establishment.
Secretaries Kissinger and Simon opposed the aid request, even though
it was supported by the African Bureau and Agency for International
Development (AID) because they believed that Kaunda's increasingly
militant speeches on the Rhodesian issue were an indication of Kaun-
da's switch to the militant camp. Moreover, the fact that both Kaunda
and the U.S.S.R. supported the Nkomo faction vis-d-vis the Rhode-
sian conflict led Kissinger to believe that Kaunda had to be watched
closely.
19781
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The dangers of Zambia's political situation were apparently lost on
both Kissinger and Simon. By early 1976, Kaunda's detente policy with
Vorster was under serious attack. The disastrous South African in-
tervention in Angola, the failure of Vorster to press the Smith regime
to make serious concessions, and the failure of Kaunda to criticize
Pretoria's continued occupation of Namibia following the expiration of
the U.N. deadline all served to discredit Kaunda's dialogue policy.
Likewise the MPLA's victory in Angola, combined with a dramatic
apsurge in the Shipanga factor of South West Africa People's
Organization (SWAPO) guerrilla activity in Namibia, presented a new
challenge to the Kaunda regime. This new SWAPO vitality disturbed
Kaunda because it occured against the backdrop of a serious split in
SWAPO ranks. Kaunda's concern was heightened by apparent ties be-
tween the Shipanga wing and anti-Kaunda Zambian dissidents in Zam-
bia's Barotse Province. This alliance, combined with the influx of dissi-
dent Ngangela and Chokwe tribesmen from Angola forced Kaunda to
place a large number of SWAPO officials under "protective" custody.
Kaunda's actions placed him in a highly volatile political situation.
With the radical Neto regime able to harass him both economically
and politically from Angola and with his only other remaining outlet
to the coast passing through Rhodesia, Botswana, and South Africa,
Kaunda clearly had no choice but to move closer to the more militant
Front-line States of Mozambique and Tanzania.
In order to counteract the African reaction to his detention of
high-level SWAPO officials, Kaunda used the pretext of Kissinger's
visit in April to travel to Mozambique for consultations. In Maputo,
Kaunda gave a militant speech on the southern African situation,
pledging full Zambian support for the liberation of Zimbabwe and
Namibia, and calling for the end of apartheid in South Africa."
Although there was an element of political chicanery in his remarks,
the Maputo speech signaled a move by Kaunda to bring his policies in-
to greater coordination with the policies of the other Front-line States.
In this regard, it is interesting to note that while Kaunda continues to
attack the Republic, South African-Zambian trade via Mozambique is
on the rise.
Kaunda saw that by adopting an alliance with Machel, he could
receive Machel's support in his conflict with Neto. Kaunda knew that
Machel distrusted the Cubans as a result of their earlier hostile at-
titude toward Mondlane. He believed that Machel would help to
"Maputo Domestic Service in Portuguese, Apr. 20, 1976, 1955 G.m.t.
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forestall any massive introduction of Soviet and/or Cuban troops in-
to the Zimbabwe struggle. Machel, like Kaunda, trusted the Chinese
more than the Russians and expected that Peking would be helpful in
limiting Moscow's influence among the Zimbabwe nationalists.
Tragically, these dynamics appear to have exerted little influence on
United States foreign policy makers who continued to view Machel as a
Soviet puppet, and Kaunda as similarly situated.
THE APRIL KISSINGER-RUMSFELD VISITS
The fiasco of the Angolan intervention and subsequent failure of
South Africa's policy of detente left United States policy in southern
Africa in ruins. As a result, in early 1976 Washington conducted a
major reappraisal of its policy. This reappraisal led to the visits of
Secretaries Kissinger and Rumsfeld to Kenya, Zambia, and Zaire that
spring. The western press heralded the visits as an indication of a
growing United States interest and involvement in southern African af-
fairs. However, a close analysis of the Kissinger-Rumsfeld visits not on-
ly gives little cause to be sanguine, but also shows the appalling lack of
official United States sensitivity to the conflict dynamics of the
southern African arena. All analyses show that the spring visits did not
signal a major change in United States foreign policy. Rather, the
results of Washington's reappraisal were merely to recast a policy
whose fundamental tenets already had been proved to be out of touch
with the realities of the southern African political milieu.
The cornerstone of Kissinger's policy reappraisal was the belief that
the West must move quickly to bolster the resolve of the moderate
Front-line States and Zaire. He feared that the Soviet Union, fresh
from the euphoria of its victory in Angola, might attempt to introduce
Soviet and/or Cuban troops into the Rhodesian and Namibian
theatres. Kissinger believed that the precedent created by Soviet-Cuban
adventurism in Angola argued for the necessity of developing a
political base from which Western influence could be exercised to limit
communist adventurism. Although the Kissinger strategy might have
been sound six months earlier, by the spring of 1976, it was doomed to
failure.
When Kissinger visited Zambia in April, he found the Kaunda
regime in dire straits. The February withdrawl of the South African
forces from southern Angola, combined with the collapse of the
UNITA-FNLA coalition, had forced Kaunda to adopt a public posture
more favorable to the MPLA. In early April, the dramatic upsurge in
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SWAPO guerrilla activity against Namibia directed from southern
Angola and southwestern Zambia, necessitated the adoption of a more
militant posture on the Rhodesian conflict and the further alignment
of Zambian policies with those of the other Front-line States. Kissinger
and Congress viewed with alarm the growing militancy of Kaunda's
speeches. The subtleties of his exposed position were lost on them
both. Consequently, the miniscule amount of economic aid extended
to Zambia provided little solace and virtually no influence.
It seems evident that Kaunda could ill afford to estrange both
Angola and Mozambique. Such a policy would force him to rely ex-
clusively on South Africa to move his country's exports, a dangerous
move domestically. As a result, in order to play off Neto, Kaunda had
little choice but to follow the lead of President Machel of Mozambique
regarding the Zimbabwe conflict. Tragically, Kissinger's skepticism
about a "moderate" like Kaunda associating with an inveterate Marxist
like Machel reflects a failure of policy that continues to hamper the
Carter Adminstration's policy regarding the Zimbabwe conflict. In
order to understand the dynamics of the Machel-Kaunda relationship
it is necessary first to turn to a brief examination of the foreign policy
of Mozambique.
MOZAMBIQUE
Beset by major domestic economic and political crises, the Machel
regime attempted in April 1974 to establish a dialogue with the South
African government on the Rhodesian conflict. However, following the
South African intervention into Angola and the continued intran-
sigence of the Smith regime, Machel increased aid to the Zimbabwe
guerrillas and upgraded their base areas in Mozambique. Nonetheless,
Machel's relations with the Republic have remained correct, if
somewhat cool.
The primary motivations behind the continuation of relations be-
tween Maputo and Pretoria are economic. Under an agreement dating
back to 1909, Mozambique provides over 140,000 workers to the South
African mines. This arrangement generates about $150 million per an-
num in badly needed foreign exchange for Mozambique. When South
Africa's own ports are heavily congested, Maputo serves as a major
port for the overflow. Maputo also serves as the export link for all of
Swaziland's iron ore exports. The giant Carbora Bassa dam forges yet
another link between the two countries. Mozambique relies upon the
South African market to purchase the excess power generated by the
[Vol. 10:67
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dam. The overall importance of these ties with South Africa is seen in
the fact that South Africa now accounts for eighty to ninety percent of
Mozambique's foreign exchange. Machel further increased his coun-
try's dependence on South Africa by closing the border with Rhodesia
in March i976. This action could result in an estimated $130 to $160
million loss for Mozambique in the first year alone.
Important to Mozambique's foreign policy is its relationship with
other southern African countries. It has trade and defense agreements
with Tanzania and a somewhat cooler relationship with Zambia.
Mozambique is dedicated to the liberation of Zimbabwe and will con-
tinue to encourage and assist the fall of the Smith regime. Barring
massive foreign intervention on the side of Smith, however, Machel is
unlikely to encourage sizeable foreign intervention on behalf of the
guerrillas. He deeply believes in the necessity of a nationalist struggle
being waged by nationalists only. Therefore, it is doubtful that massive
infusions of either Russian and/or Cuban troops into the Mozam-
bique camps will be permitted. Indeed, until recently only the Chinese
have been allowed to send advisors into the forward base areas, at-
testing that Machel keeps a firm rein on membership in the Zimbabwe
guerrilla camps.
Unfortunately, the United States Congress and defense community
seem unconcerned about Machel's exposed position. Mozambique is in
dire financial straits. If the United States were to send aid to Maputo,
Machel's position seemingly would be strenghtened. The tendency of
the defense community, however, is to see Machel only as an im-
placable Marxist, who will buckle under the Soviet yoke, which is a
serious policy misconception. Indeed, there is evidence that the United
States' failure to support Machel could bring about the very situation
(i.e. increased Soviet influence) that the United States is trying
desperately to avoid. Ironically, it is the effort to keep Soviet influence
at a minimum that underlies the foreign policies of the Kaunda,
Nyerere (of Tanzania) and Machel regimes towards the Zimbabwe con-
flict. It is a high-risk policy decision by Zambia and Mozambique to
support a major guerrilla campaign in Zimbabwe. Not only are they
extremely vulnerable to economic and political pressures, but also they
are vulnerable to Rhodesian "hot pursuit" or punitive raids.
Nonetheless, the commitment was made out of the belief that their in-
tervention alone could hasten the tmansition to majority rule and en-
sure that they, and not other external powers, would govern the pace
of events.
1978]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Because the United States failed to make an adequate assessment
of the nature of the Machel-Kaunda relationship, United States policy
towards Rhodesia floundered during the summer and fall of 1976. The
strategy that Kissinger employed was inadequate because it was based
on the same power relationships that had existed following the over-
throw of the Lisbon regime. According to this strategy, the Front-line
Presidents (Machel of Mozambique, Nyerere of Tanzania, Kaunda of
Zambia, and Khama of Botswana) would pressure the fractious Zim-
babwe nationalists into a coalition and toward the negotiating table
while Vorster would put pressure on Smith. Kissinger believed that the
successful outcome of the ensuing negotiations would ensure (1) the
pre-emption of the political-military liberation groups, (2) a transition
environment that would allow state-to-state relations with the successor
government, (3) that a large segment of skilled white Rhodesians
would remain and avert repetition of the Angolan debacle, (4) suffi-
cient international legitimacy for the successor government, forestalling
continued liberation efforts.
Kissinger failed to note that by the summer and fall of 1976 the
Rhodesian political situation had changed dramatically. The Soweto
riots, following closely upon the Angolan fiasco, effectively destroyed
any remaining credibility Pretoria may have had as an agent of
peaceful change in southern Africa. South Africa's failure to under-
stand the subtleties of Kaunda's exposed position and its bombing of
Zambian villages while pursuing SWAPO terrorists were gross policy
errors. Finally, Pretoria's response to increased SWAPO raids was a
military build-up in northern Namibia. Although a sound military
policy, this move did little to lend credence to Vorster's mid-1976
claim that Namibia would achieve independence under constitutional
terms by December 31, 1978.
By the spring of 1976, any pretense that the Front-line Presidents
would be able to keep together a coalition of the rival Rhodesian na-
tionalist movements was shattered as fratricidal conflict among the
groups, both inside and outside Rhodesia, escalated to new levels. Kis-
singer failed to realize that the only actor in the Zimbabwe struggle
benefiting both from the declining unity of Zimbabwe nationalists and
the sagging fortunes of Vorster was Ian Smith. By the time Kissinger
put forward his Rhodesian proposals in September 1976 the wily Smitt
saw a means by which he could torped6 the negotiations while at the
same time proclaiming a willingness to pursue the Kissinger initiatives.
Throughout the fall and winter of 1976, Smith capitalized on divi-
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sions within the nationalist ranks, a lame-duck United States Ad-
ministration, and an effective counter-insurgency program to buy time.
Following the inauguration of the new United States President, and
the creditable effort by the British diplomat, Ivor Richard, to break
the stalemated negotiations, Smith rejected the British proposals
stating that agreement had already been reached on the Kissinger
plan. If the Zimbabwe exiled nationalist groups refused to live by the
agreement, then Smith would enact the proposals unilaterally and
begin to negotiate a "transition to majority rule." In his pronounce-
ment rejecting the Richard proposals, Smith announced that all racial-
ly discriminatory legislation would be repealed, although he did not
pinpoint which specific laws. Apparently, Smith hoped that if his in-
itiatives were viewed favorably in the West, there might be a lifting of
economic sanctions against the regime.
Smith's position was further strengthened by the announcement on
January 9, 1977, by the Front-line Presidents in Lusaka that
henceforth their total support would go to the Patriotic Front, headed
by Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. The eclipse of the popular
Bishop Muzorewa left Smith the possibility of negotiating with
Muzorewa, Sithole, or Chikerema under the framework of the Kiss-
inger proposals.
THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION
Unfortunately Kissinger's inability to deal competently with the
realities of southern African regional politics passed on to the Carter
Administration. In the general euphoria accompanying his first major
diplomatic trip to Africa, Ambassador Young stated that United States
policy on Rhodesia was to follow the lead of the Front-line States in
support of the Patriotic Front. By failing to note the justifications of
Zambian and Botswanan support for the Front, i.e. their exposed posi-
tions, Young allowed United States policy to drift into a dangerous
new area. If Smith concluded an agreement with Muzorewa which
would install a moderately popular elected government, United States
policy, as outlined by Young, would be eclipsed. Ironically, Kaunda
was sensitive to this danger. He took the unprecedented step of utiliz-
ing Soviet President Podgorny's March 1977 visit to announce that
Zambia would not impose a political solution on Zimbabwe. Realizing
the inadequacy of United States sensitivity to intra-Zimbabwe na-
tionalist politics, Kaunda. signaled to Muzorewa that the final political
solution for Rhodesia might not rest with the Patriotic Front and that
he should not foreclose his options by dealing with Smith.
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In viewing Kaunda's rebuff of the Soviets in conjunction with the
cool reception that Nyerere also gave to Podgorny, it should be ap-
parent that the Front-line Presidents are far from allowing the Soviets
to dictate a political solution to the Zimbabwe conflict. Even though
Podgorny received a warm welcome in Maputo, Machel was careful to
make clear that the Soviets would not gain a naval base in Mozam-
bique. This should be viewed as a signal to Washington, Peking and
Pretoria that Machel, although firmly committed to Zimbabwe's
liberation, will not allow the Soviets a more active presence in Mozam-
bique.
The danger to United States policy lies in the failure to discern
these signals and effectively pressure Smith through Pretoria. All of the
Front-line Presidents may have to turn to the Soviets to protect their
frontiers from the increasing number of Rhodesian punitive attacks.
Already, there are indications that Mozambique has requested the in-
troduction of Soviet SAM missiles to use against Rhodesian aircraft.
BOTSWANA
Botswana is another important actor in the Zimbabwe conflict.
United States policy has been woefully inadequate in responding to the
political, economic and military plight of the Khama government.
Geographically, Botswana is at the center of the southern African
crisis, nearly surrounded by Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe.
Despite its strategic position, Botswana's role in the evolving crisis is
limited because of its barren landscape. The vast Kalahari Desert and
Okavango Swamps comprise much of Botswana. Also, even though
Botswana is the size of France, it has only about 650,000 people.
Dependent on South Africa and Rhodesia for almost all of its
essential supplies, the Khama Government has been a consistent critic
of the evils of apartheid and racial discrimination in neighboring coun-
tries. As in Zambia, the escalating crisis in Rhodesia has posed a dif-
ficult dilemma for Khama. An assessment of Botswana's strategic posi-
tion reveals two possible courses of action against its neighbors. First, it
could close down the branch of the Rhodesia Railway running through
its territory connecting Rhodesia and South Africa. However, this
would have serious repercussions on the Botswana economy, while
Rhodesia could shift its goods to the direct rail link with South Africa
over the Beit Bridge. Second, Botswana could open up its territory to
Zimbabwe guerrillas and bring a new front to the struggle. In the past,
some guerrillas have been allowed to operate from its territory, but
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publicly adopting this policy could leave poorly-armed Botswana open
to direct or covert attack. In fact, it has already been bombed by
Rhodesian forces. Its exposed position leaves Botswana little choice but
to continue its work for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian and
Rhodesian problems.
Given its vulnerability, a violent turn in the southern African
political milieu can only harm Botswana. However, if that eventuality
comes to pass, Khama will most likely follow the lead of Kaunda and
Nyerere and commit Botswana to the conflict. The vulnerability of all
the Front-line States necessitates that the United States must move
quickly if it wants to avoid an escalation in the level of the conflict.
Clearly, the failure to act decisively will benefit only the Smith regime.
There is evidence that Smith believes that if he continues to strike
out across Rhodesia's borders, then the Front-line Presidents will be
forced to accept an ever-increasing Soviet and/or Cuban presence.
This would justify his contention that the entire guerrilla struggle is
another case of Soviet adventurism attempting to disrupt vital western
interests. Apparently, Smith believes that combining this policy and
negotiations based on the Kissinger proposals with moderate black
groups will lend credibility to the Soviet threat. This threat might be
accepted by hawkish and conservative forces in the western world.
Although this strategy may appear ridiculous on the surface, it
could pose acute problems for United States policy if Smith could work
out a deal with Muzorewa, Sithole, or Chikerema to install a popularly
backed black government. To avoid this possibility the United States
must move forcefully to dramatize its support for black rule in
Rhodesia. The repeal of the Byrd amendment is a positive first step.
However, the United States should (1) immediately establish compen-
satory aid on a significant scale for Mozambique, Zambia and
Botswana, (2) warn the Soviets and Cubans that interposition of their
troops in Rhodesia would have grave ramifications in United States
policy areas of real interest to them (grain sales, SALT, European
security), (3) pressure the South Africans by threatening curtailment of
bank loans and other economic benefits unless Smith's export links
through the Republic are reduced in direct proportion to his con-
tinued intransigence, (4) warn Rhodesia that the United States and
Great Britain will under no circumstances intervene on its behalf, (5)
push for the establishment of a peace-keeping force from the Organi-
zation of African Unity or the United Nations that would be available
on a contingency basis, (6) move for the enforcement of United Na-
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tions sanctions under Article 39 if Smith does not reopen decisive
negotiations with the nationalists within a narrow time period.
These recommendations may seem to be reckless and lacking any
guarantee that they could or would bring Smith to heel. However,
failure to implement them will further estrange the United States and
the Zimbabwe leadership and situation of the Front-line States playing
into the hands of the Soviet Union.
ANGOLA AND ZAIRE
The triumph of the MPLA forces in Angola in early 1976 made a
shambles of United States policy towards southern Africa. That
triumph also threatened to undermine the security of the moderate
Mobutu and Kaunda regimes. For the Mobutu regime in Zaire the vic-
tory of the MPLA forces posed grave security problems. Zaire's foreign
policy primarily focused on the question of access to foreign ports.
Copper accounted for sixty-five percent of its export earnings. Until
the civil war in Angola caused the closing of the Benguela railway,
nearly fifty percent of Zaire's copper exports followed this route to
Lobito and world markets. Sizeable quantities of minerals were also
shipped through Zambia and Rhodesia to Maputo and Beira on the
Mozambique coast. The closing of Zambia's and Mozambique's borders
with Rhodesia closed this route. Although two other export routes
theoretically exist-through Tanzania to Dar es Salaam, or through
Uganda to Mombasa, Kenya -political, economic, and port congestion
problems make these almost useless.
By early 1976 Mobutu was in serious trouble. All his export links to
the sea were cut off except for Zaire's own antiquated route by road,
rail and water to Matadi on the Atlantic Coast. Political problems
were compounded on the economic front by the continuing slump in
the world price of copper. This crisis undermined the confidence of
Zaire's external creditors who refused to provide more credit when
$500 million of interest-bearing obligations were already in default. It
also produced a catastrophic drop in Zaire's international financial
position, and severely curtailed many of Zaire's development plans.
Confronted by this disastrous situation, Mobutu in early 1976 moved
to enter into negotiations with Neto in order to normalize relations. As
part of the settlement package, Neto, confronting mounting political
problems in his own country, agreed to stop his support for the
Katangan gendarmes if Mobutu would (1) stop the transit of mercen-
aries through Angola, (2) deny the use of Zaire territory to remnant
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forces of the defeated FNLA-UNITA coalition, and (3) cease his sup-
port for the Cabindan separatists who were trying to detach the oil-
rich enclave from the rest of Angola.
Although Neto lived up to the terms of the agreement, Mobutu,
despite his reiterated promises and denials, has continued to support
the FNLA, the Cabindan separatists, and UNITA. He even allowed
UNITA to establish an office in Kinshasa following its official expul-
sion from Zambia.
The level of FNLA, FLEC, and UNITA attacks increased drama-
tically following the spring 1976 visits to Zaire of Secretaries Kissinger
and Rumsfeld, a fact which raises the serious question of whether or
not the United States has attempted to sow discord in Angola despite
the congressional ban imposed on such activity in January 1976.
It is tragic that Kissinger's entire African policy was based on the
erroneous assumption that the United States had to support the anti-
MPLA coalition (FNLA-UNITA) because of the MPLA's complete
domination by pro-Soviet elements." 2 Kissinger's misapprehension of
Soviet control over the MPLA was reinforced by almost all of the
United States strategic studies community who, by their support of
Kissinger's policies, exhibited an appalling ignorance of Angolan
political realities.s
Most of these analysts seemed unaware of the fact that since com-
ing to power the Neto regime had moved to check the influence of the
ultra pro-Soviet and anti-mulatto elements within the MPLA by
removing them from the Cabinet. Instead, Neto placed Cubans in key
positions to help him both institute a multiracial society and counter-
balance the influence of Soviet technicians in certain key ministries."'
What is disturbing is that although the Carter Administration has
professed its desire to normalize relations with Angola, its continued
widespread financial and military support for the Mobutu regime
reflects a frightful ignorance of Zairois-Angolan relations and, more
particularly, the 'political machinations of General Mobutu.
There can be little doubt that the increased level of FNLA-UNITA
and FLEC activity, combined with ever greater incursions by South
Africa across the Namibian border, has severely threatened the con-
"2Kissinger was opposed in this belief by most of the State Department's African
Bureau.
"sFor a representative study see W. HAHN & A. COTTRELL, SOVIET SHADOW
OVER AFRICA (1976).
'
4Ebinger, supra note 2, at 697-98.
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tinued viability of the Neto regime. Indeed, from the report of a
former aide of Senator Tunney who recently returned from Luanda, it
is apparent both that MPLA search-and-destroy missions are occurring
only thirty-five miles from the capital and that the bulk of the Cuban
forces are needed in Cabinda to repulse growing attacks by the Cabin-
dan separatist forces of FLEC and Molica. 15
Beseiged on all sides by his enemies (particularly Zaire), Neto has a
valuable trump card in the Katangan gendarmes. While the extent to
which Angolan, Cuban, or Soviet forces controlled the gendarmes' re-
cent incursion into Zaire remains uncertain, the Carter Administration
has been disingenuous in not pointing out to the American people that
the raison d'9tre for the invasion was largely a matter of Zairois inter-
nal politics dating back to the early 1960's. To the extent that external
factors were involved, American support for Zairois political designs on
Angola and/or Cabinda were at least as much a cardinal ingredient as
was Soviet and/or Cuban adventurism. Indeed, there has been no firm
evidence of Soviet complicity to date.
The absurd duality of United States policy in the current Zairois
political crisis has been aggravated by the United States' insistence that
improved relations with Havana and/or Luanda cannot occur until the
Cuban forces are withdrawn from Angola. If the Cuban forces were to
withdraw at a time when United States military aid to Zaire is on the
rise, the Neto regime would be imperilled and would have no choice
but to rely on the Soviet Union for enhanced support, thus bringing
about the very situation that United States policy is struggling to pre-
vent.
Although there can be no doubt that the "invasion" by the
Katangan gendarmes poses a grave threat to the continuation of the
Mobutu regime, there are several critical factors that should be
assiduously weighed by the United States in formulating its policy
towards a situation which may end in political crisis. These factors are:
(1) The implications for our policy if the "invaders" receive continued
long-term and widespread support from the local Katangan population
or sizeable elements therein, (2) the degree to which our own increased
aid to Zaire has precipitated the crisis by allowing Zaire to funnel the
aid to anti-MPLA forces, (3) the impossibility of Cuban military with-
drawal from Angola if the Neto regime continues to be beleaguered on
all fronts, (4) the question of whether in fact the interests of Neto and
the Cubans coincide with those of the Soviet Union, (5) the potential
"SMovement for the Liberation of Cabinda, formed in Paris on Apr. 13, 1976.
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for a disintegration of Zaire if the Katangan gendarmes link with other
old-line anti-Mobutu elements and the question of how this could af-
fect the stability of the region, (6) the effect of the crisis upon other
United States relations in central and southern Africa, (7) the pos-
sibility that the assassinations of President Ngouabi and the Cardinal
of Brazzaville may be linked with Soviet interests in Brazzaville and
Brazzaville-Zaire relations, and (8) the question of whether the Carter
Administration has been disingenuous with the American people in
portraying the crisis, or merely naive as to African political realities.
Until these questions are adequately addressed and until the Carter
Administration begins both to reexamine the basis of some of the
fundamental tenets of United States southern African policy (e.g., the
pivotal role of the Mobutu regime) and to exhibit some understanding
of the interaction of southern African events, United States policy will
remain enmeshed in crisis diplomacy rather than be grounded in long
term effective crisis management.
NAMIBIA
The geopolitical significance of Namibia lies in its importance as a
significant producer of gem diamonds, arsenic, vanadium, lead, zinc,
and lithium. By 1980 Namibia will be a sizeable producer of uranium.
However, despite Namibia's attributes, it has two major problems
relating to its industrial development: a lack of water and an incessant
demand for a cheap supply of labor.
Indeed, one of the chief reasons South Africa intervened in the
Angolan civil war was to protect the giant hydroelectric complex on
the Cunene River in southern Angola. The Cunene complex is vital to
the continued growth of almost all the developing mining industry in
Namibia. The Cunene development project (consisting of about 40
dams) will supply water and power to drought-ridden Ovamboland,
Grootfontein, the Tsumeb mining facility, Windhoek, Walvis Bay and
Rio Tinto Zinc's complex at Rossing, which may hold one of the
world's largest deposits of uranium.
Currently, Namibia's mining industry accounts for about sixty per-
cent of the country's export earnings. The major producers are the
American-owned Tsumeb Corporation (copper, lead, silver, and zinc)
and the South African-owned Consolidated Diamond Mines. Namibia's
diamonds are among the best in the world and were responsible for
over forty percent of the giant De Beers conglomerate's profits in 1974.
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In addition to these industrial giants, smaller copper mines are being
developed at Otjihase, Witvlei and Oamites.
Of greatest interest to the future development of Namibia is the
massive potential of the Rossing uranium complex owned by Rio Tinto
Zinc. No project in southern Africa has generated as much controversy
as has the Rossing complex. The debate on the Rossing project centers
on the constitutional status of Namibia. Rio Tinto Zinc argues that
South Africa is the administrative authority of Namibia. It rejects the
view that the United Nations has the right to declare Pretoria's oc-
cupation of Namibia illegal and denies that the United Nations Coun-
cil for Namibia has any administrative jurisdiction over the territory.
The problem is further complicated by the fact that in 1975 the
United Nations General Assembly passed a decree banning mineral ex-
ploitation in Namibia without prior authorization from the United Na-
tions Council for Namibia, and stated that exports of Namibian
natural resources would be liable for seizure. Although Rio Tinto Zinc
showed some willingness at least to talk with SWAPO officials during
the latter half of 1976, the situation remains at an impassee. SWAPO,
however, has warned Rio Tinto Zinc that the development of Rossing
is helping to support South Africa's occupation of Namibia and that
SWAPO, upon independence, might make demands for back
payments of royalties and taxes paid to the South African government.
The largest customer of the Rossing mine in the future will be
Great Britain. British Nuclear Fuels has contracted to purchase 7,500
tons of uranium oxide in the period from 1976 to 1982, a decision
which has generated considerable debate within British Labor Party
circles. The situation is complicated by the fact that Great Britain,
unlike most of the rest of the international community, has not dis-
couraged firms from investing in Namibia. The Rossing mine is impor-
tant to Great Britain because, by the early 1980's, Rossing uranium
could be providing more than half of Britain's total uranium require-
ments.
One may ask why, given the volatile political climate reigning in
Namibia, Rio Tinto Zinc decided to develop the Rossing mine complex
at all. The answer is simple. Rossing's low production costs combined
with high uranium prices may enable Rio Tinto Zinc to *recoup its
enormous development costs (C120 million) within two or three years
once the mine is in full production. The main risk for Rio Tinto Zinc
remains the political one: Its continued profitability will be dependent
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on whether it is able to come to terms with political developments in
Namibia.
The military victory of the MPLA-Cuban forces against the South
African army in Angola, had profound reamifications in United States
policy vis-d-vis Namibia. As noted above, prior to the Angolan crisis,
United States policy had been predicated on the belief that by support-
ing the dialogue between the moderate Front-line States and Pretoria,
a peaceful solution to both the Zimbabwe and Namibian political crisis
could be found.
However, with the widespread international recognition of the Neto
regime and thorough repudiation of Pretoria's detente policy following
its Angolan intervention, the dynamics of the Namibian political situa-
tion took on new dimensions. Clearly, with the installation of a friend-
ly regime along Namibia's northern frontier, SWAPO's ability to wage
an increasingly effective guerrilla campaign along the entire 1,000-mile
border, and particularly against the Ovambo and Kavango Bantustans,
was enhanced.
The change in the political situation in Namibia posed difficult
problems for the United States. While the United States remained
publicly committed to a peaceful transition to majority rule in
Namibia through the constitutional talks (Turnhalle Conference) in-
itiated by South Africa in mid-1975, South Africa's burgeoning fortifi-
cation of the Angolan-Namibian frontier furnished fuel to those critics
of the talks who said the talks would lead to Namibia's eventual annex-
ation by the Republic.
The formulation of a coherent United States policy vis-d-vu
Namibia has been complicated by the fact that SWAPO has been
recognized by the United Nations as the sole representative of the
Namibian people, although a large percentage of the Namibian
population believe that SWAPO is an Ovambo-based organization hav-
ing little support outside the northern area of the country. Although
this is not precisely the case, the real extent of SWAPO's support must
be questioned. Neglect of this question could result in a black govern-
ment installed through the Turnhalle Conference without the par-
ticipation of SWAPO. If SWAPO then tries to overthrow it by force, a
dangerous international crisis could develop.
The political situation in Namibia is further complicated by
SWAPO's recent decision not to participate in the Turnhalle Con-
ference which was established by the South African government as a
vehicle for bringing about Namibian independence within two years.
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Although there are some indications that SWAPO's anti-Turnhalle
position may be reassessed, SWAPO publicly continues to denounce
the Turnhalle Conference as a well calculated and deliberate political
maneuver aimed at bantustanism and subsequent annexation by South
Africa. It should be noted, however, that in recent months many
leading SWAPO members, impatient with the dogma of the Soviet-
backed SWAPO leadership, have begun to return to Namibia to
engage in the dialogue process.16
What is appalling about United States policy towards Namibia is
that there does not seem to be any rationale behind it. Although the
United States has warned American investors that they cannot expect
to receive diplomatic support if a future Namibian government ques-
tions the legality of their holdings, United States policy exhibits some
serious shortcomings. For example, while opposing the proposal to
establish the United Nations Council on Namibia, the United States
.has put forth no proposal of its own which might help facilitate the
removal of the de jure illegal government.
Furthermore, despite United States public support for the rulings
of the International Court of Justice and its obligation as a United Na-
tions member, the United States continues to allow trade and invest-
ment in Namibia and permits all United States firms located there to
take credit on their United States taxes for the taxes they pay to the il-
legal South African government. In addition, the United States has an-
nounced that it opposes implementation of the United Nations Charter
enforcement procedures against South Africa.
In Namibia, the United States in confronted by a situation in
which its current policy is inadequate. While the United States has
always taken the position in the United Nations that it favors United
Nations-supervised elections, a close reading of Kissinger's Lusaka
speech reveals a contradictory approach. In Lusaka, through his sup-
port for an expanded Turnhalle Conference, Kissinger clearly gave the
South Africans the green light to proceed with their current plan to
bring Namibia to independence within two years. While speaking of
the necessity of United Nations supervision of the elections, Kissinger
also neglected to mention the need for United Nations "control" of the
elections.
However, from a close reading of the Turnhalle documents, it is
apparent that no one at the conference ever mentioned a future role
161 am indebted to Dr. Richard Bissell of the Foreign Policy Research Institute in
Philadelphia for calling this to my attention.
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for the United Nations. Given this fact and given SWAPO's continued
refusal to participate in the Turnhalle Conference, it is difficult to see
where the current impasse leaves United States policy. In fact, Am-
bassador Young's recent comment that the United States' Namibian
policy remains based on the principles laid down in the Kissinger
Lusaka speech raises the questions of who makes African policy in the
United States.
CONCLUSION
In the months ahead, the United States will confront a series of
difficult choices in the formulation of its southern African policy. Since
there will be widely varying perspectives concerning its interests and
options, the fundamental dilemma confronting the United States will
be to choose between its short term and long term interests.
Although the above analysis has been cursory in view of the
magnitude of the problems involved, it is apparent that the United
States has failed to implement an effective southern African policy.
This failure is due both to its unwillingness to address seriously the
constellation of political forces extant in the area and its reluctance to
jettison ideological patterns of analysis which view all southern Africa
events in terms of stark United States-Soviet great power rivalry.
In this regard, the failure of the Nixon and Ford Administrations
to cast aside the assumption that there is a contradiction between
United States interests and the end of white minority rule in southern
Africa can only be viewed as tragic. Although the Carter Administra-
tion has pronounced itself ready to change past American policy errors
and to work for a transition to black majority rule in Namibia and
Rhodesia, its present policies with respect to Angola, Zaire, Namibia,
Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Mozambique not only exhibit an appalling ig-
norance of African political realities but also raise doubts whether any
reassessment of United States policy has occurred.
Although Kissinger's Lusaka speech has been much heralded as in-
dicative of a basic change in United States southern African policy,it
has been shown that the Lusaka speech is full of ambiguities and raises
more questions than it answers. The fact that the Carter Administra-
tion points to this speech as the cornerstone of its policy gives little
cause for solace.
It has been demonstrated that the overriding concern of United
States policymakers with the "global view" of southern African events
led three successive United States administrations to perceive African
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political alignments in a way which prevented them from effectively
utilizing forces in Angola and Mozambique to prevent the very increase
of Soviet influence that United States policy was designed to thwart.
Kissinger's policy with respect to both the MPLA and the Machel
regime can only be viewed as a gross policy error.
Ironically, Kissinger's failure to understand the dynamics of the
regional conflicts led him to neglect evaluation of the anti-Chinese
component of the Soviet African policy with disastrous consequences
for the region. The withdrawal of the Chinese paved the way for
Pretoria's interventionary fiasco and led to the eclipse of viable United
States policy options throughout the area.
Finally, although it would be encouraging to perceive the African
diplomacy of the Carter Administration as heralding a new era in
United States African policy perception, recent United States policies
concerning the Katangan invasion, the Zimbabwe and Namibian con-
flicts, and the Angolan regime give little cause for confidence and
much cause for alarm.
[Vol. 10:67
